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Twenty-four years ago, Judge Frank Easterbrook delivered the 
Sumner Canary Lecture on the topic “presidential review.”1 In that 
memorable and often-cited lecture,2 Judge Easterbrook argued that 
the President must interpret the Constitution in the performance of 
his executive duties and act “at variance with statutory law, when 
persuaded that the law departs from the Constitution.”3 He main-
tained that the President has a duty to exercise a power of executive 
review on par with the power of judicial review exercised by the 
Supreme Court.4 I want to return to the topic of executive review but 
not limit myself to the topic of the President’s duty.  
 
†. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit; 
Commissioner, United States Sentencing Commission; Visiting 
Professor, University of Alabama School of Law; Adjunct Professor, 
Samford University, Cumberland School of Law. I thank Taylor Meehan 
for her research assistance and helpful comments. This Article is based 
on the 2014 Sumner Canary Lecture delivered by Judge Pryor at Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law on October 2, 2014. 
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
905 (1990). 
2. Many scholars have cited and expanded on Judge Easterbrook’s 
argument. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible 
Duty to Defend, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 507 (2012); Saikrishna Prakash, 
Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J. 81 (2007); Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against 
Interpretive Supremacy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1539 (2005); John Harrison, 
The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review, 84 Va. 
L. Rev. 333 (1998); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Execu-
tive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267 
(1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217 (1994). 
3. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 905–06. 
4. Id. at 919–22. 
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I want to endorse and restate Judge Easterbrook’s argument using 
both a contemporary controversy and my earlier experience as a state 
attorney general as frames of reference. In the last few years, both 
federal and state executives have refused to defend laws respecting 
traditional marriage. Although I cannot discuss whether the Consti-
tution grants homosexual couples a right to marry while that issue is 
being litigated in several courts, I will argue that supporters of 
judicial restraint and the separation of powers should defend the 
authority of both the federal executive and state executives not to 
enforce or defend laws that they, in good faith, conclude violate the 
Constitution.  
I acknowledge that, by addressing the duty of state executives, I 
go beyond what Judge Easterbrook was willing to argue. In his lec-
ture, Judge Easterbrook declined to defend the authority of a state 
executive to interpret the Constitution. He put it this way: “There is 
a big difference between a power in the President and a power in 
Orville Faubus.”5 But I will argue that the logic of Judge Easter-
brook’s argument for presidential review suggests no material differ-
ence between federal and state executive review. 
Let us consider the contemporary context. In 2011, President 
Barack Obama concluded that Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act, as applied to homosexual couples married under state law, 
violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.6 Attorney General Eric Holder then 
instructed attorneys in the Department of Justice not to defend 
Section 3 of the Act in pending litigation.7 But President Obama 
instructed other executive officials to comply with Section 3 while 
that litigation remained pending.8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
decided last year in United States v. Windsor9 that, even though the 
executive branch refused to defend Section 3, there still remained a 
“case or controversy” between Edith Windsor and the executive 
branch.10 
Meanwhile, in lawsuits challenging state constitutional amend-
ments defining marriage as between a man and a woman, several 
state attorneys general refused to defend those amendments and 
instead argued that the amendments violate the Equal Protection 
 
5. Id. at 924. 
6. Letter from Eric H. Holder Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
10. Id. at 2684–89. 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.11 Even the attorneys general of a few Southern states—
Virginia,12 North Carolina,13 and Kentucky14—refused to defend the 
marriage amendments to their state constitutions. Attorney General 
Holder weighed in on that issue in February of this year and argued 
that state attorneys general are not obligated to defend their state 
constitutional amendments.15 He explained that “[i]f [he] were attor-
ney general in Kansas in 1953, [he] would not have defended a Kansas 
statute that put in place separate-but-equal facilities.”16 
Some state officials refused to continue the defense of their state 
laws only after lower federal courts ruled that traditional marriage 
laws were unconstitutional. On May 21, Governor Tom Corbett, for 
example, announced that he would not appeal a decision by a federal 
district judge that the marriage laws of Pennsylvania violated the 
federal Constitution.17 And on July 28, Attorney General Roy Cooper 
of North Carolina announced that he would no longer defend the 
marriage laws of his state after the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit ruled that the same kind of laws in Virginia 
violated the federal Constitution.18 
These refusals to defend laws have been sharply criticized, 
especially by conservatives. Attorney General John Suthers of 
 
11. Juliet Eilperin, State Officials Decline to Defend Some Divisive Laws, 
Wash. Post, July 19, 2013, at A1; Jess Bravin, Gay Marriage a Test 
for State Laws’ Defenders, Wall St. J., Mar. 8–9, 2014, at A6; Matt 
Apuzzo, Holder Sees Way to Curb Bans on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 25, 2014, at A1. 
12. Press Release, Commonwealth of Va. Office of the Att’y Gen., Attorney 
General Herring Changes Virginia’s Legal Position in Marriage Equality 
Case (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.oag.state.va.us/index. 
php/media-center/news-releases/96-attorney-general-herring-changes-
virginia-s-legal-position-in-marriage-equality-case. 
13. Amanda Lamb, NC to Stop Defending Marriage Amendment, WRAL. 
com (July 29, 2014), http://www.wral.com/nc-to-stop-defending-
marriage-amendment/13846324/.  
14. Aaron Blake & Sean Sullivan, Kentucky Gov. Steve Beshear (D) Will 
Appeal Pro-Gay Marriage Ruling, Wash. Post (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/04/ 
kentucky-wont-appeal-gay-marriage-ruling/. 
15. Apuzzo, supra note 11. 
16. Id. 
17. Press Release, Office of the Governor of PA, Statement Regarding the 
Opinion of Judge Jones in the Whitewood Case (May 21, 2014), 
available at http://www.pa.gov/pages/newsdetails.aspx?agency=pagovn
ews&item=15643. 
18. See Lamb, supra note 13. 
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Colorado, for example, published an op-ed in the Washington Post on 
February 3 in which he argued that “this practice corrodes our system 
of checks and balances, public belief in the power of democracy and 
ultimately the moral and legal authority on which attorneys general 
must depend.”19 General Suthers acknowledged that on some occa-
sions an attorney general cannot “in good faith defend a law,” but he 
argued that an attorney general must defend a controversial law so 
long as it is not “‘clearly unconstitutional’” based on binding prece-
dent of the Supreme Court.20 In January, Attorney General Lawrence 
Wasden of Idaho argued that he had an “obligation as the attorney 
general . . . to defend [his] state’s view, the people’s view.” 21  In 
March, former attorney general Ken Cuccinelli of Virginia criticized 
his successor, Mark Herring, for refusing to defend the Virginia 
amendment on marriage.22 Cuccinnelli asserted, “If you’re going to 
run for attorney general, this is part of the job. . . . If you’re not 
willing to do it, you ought not run.”23 In Michigan, Attorney General 
Bill Schuette argued that he was “duty-bound to defend the wishes of 
the voters. To do anything less would be a dereliction of duty.”24 And 
conservative commentator Ed Whelan wrote earlier this year in The 
Weekly Standard that state attorneys general must “vigorously defend 
any [state] laws against challenge under federal law so long as there 
are reasonable (i.e., nonfrivolous) grounds for doing so.”25 
On this issue, the so-called duty to defend, I part ways with these 
conservatives. I submit that neither the President nor the Attorney 
General of the United States nor any state executive, whether a 
governor or attorney general, is bound to either enforce or defend a 
 
19. John W. Suthers, Editorial, State Legal Authorities Turn Political, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2014, at A15.  
20. Id. 
21. Scott Graf, Idaho Attorney General Wasden Will Continue to Defend 
State’s Gay Marriage Ban, Boise St. Pub. Radio (Jan. 28, 2014, 6:00 
AM), http://boisestatepublicradio.org/post/idaho-attorney-general-
wasden-will-continue-defend-states-gay-marriage-ban. 
22. Jacob Fenston, Cuccinelli Blasts Herring for Not Defending Virginia 
Gay Marriage Ban, WAMU 88.5 (Mar. 16, 2014),  http://wamu.org/ 
news/14/03/16/cuccinelli_blasts_herring_for_not_defending_virginia
_gay_marriage_ban. 
23. Id. 
24. Bill Schuette, Letter to the Editor, Defending Traditional Marriage Is 
Defending the State Constitution, Detroit Free Press, Mar. 25, 
2014, http://archive.freep.com/article/20140325/OPINION04/30325001
7/michigan-gay-marriage-same-sex-bill-schuette-response-rights. 
25. Edward Whelan, Falling Down on the Job: State AGs Shirk Their Duty 
to Defend State Laws, Wkly. Standard, Feb. 17, 2014, at 14, 16. 
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law that the executive officer in good faith concludes violates the 
federal Constitution. Executive officers, both federal and state, are 
duty-bound to interpret and obey the Constitution in the performance 
of their duties, and in doing so, they owe no deference to other 
authorities. 
To explain my perspective, I will address three matters. First, I 
will explain the classical understanding of an executive’s authority to 
interpret the Constitution in the performance of his duties. Second, I 
will explain how that understanding guided me in the performance of 
my duties in different kinds of legal controversies when I formerly 
served as a state attorney general. Third, I will explain the 
comparative advantages of having executive officials take seriously the 
duty to obey the Constitution without deferring to other branches of 
government. 
I. The Duty of Executive Review 
The duty to interpret the Constitution begins and ends with 
every officer’s oath. The Constitution provides that all executives, 
legislators, and judges, both federal and state, “shall be bound by 
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”26  That clause 
appears in clause 3 of Article VI, and fittingly follows the Supremacy 
Clause in clause 2 of Article VI. And the Supremacy Clause, of 
course, makes the Constitution the supreme law of the land. So when 
an executive officer, federal or state, swears to support the 
Constitution, he swears to support it as the highest of all laws. 
In the event of a conflict between the Constitution and a federal 
or state law, every executive must support the Constitution. As Chief 
Justice John Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison,27 “a law 
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other 
departments, are bound by that instrument.”28 That concluding pas-
sage of Marbury means that a law in conflict with the Constitution is 
a nullity—that is, no law at all—and all departments—executive, 
legislative, and judicial—must follow the Constitution as the law and 
ignore the nullity. And that logic applies no matter whether the 
executive sworn to support the Constitution is a federal or state 
officer. 
Our constitutional history establishes that many presidents have 
exercised an independent power of executive review. Washington, 
Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, and Lincoln, among others, interpreted 
the Constitution in the performance of their executive duties without  
26. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3. 
27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
28. Id. at 180. 
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deferring to the interpretations of either the judiciary or Congress. 
And sometimes those presidents had the last word. 
As Judge Easterbrook explained in his lecture, early presidents 
often vetoed legislation on constitutional grounds.29 President Wash-
ington vetoed the first bill apportioning representatives among the 
states.30 President Madison vetoed a bill chartering a church in the 
District of Columbia31 and a bill for internal improvements32 both on 
constitutional grounds. And President Jackson vetoed a bill to reauth-
orize the national bank33 even though the Supreme Court had held 
that Congress had the power to charter the bank.34 
Thomas Jefferson provided perhaps the most provocative 
examples of executive review. Jefferson considered the Sedition Act of 
1798 to violate the First Amendment.35 As a result, while he served as 
president, he refused to prosecute anyone for violating the Act, and he 
pardoned all who had been convicted for violating it even though the 
courts had upheld the Act.36 
President Lincoln, of course, rejected the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford.37 Lincoln acknowledged the author-
ity of the decision as between the parties.38 But he refused to abide by 
its rule in other matters of executive responsibility.39 
 
29. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 907–08. 
30. George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), in 1 A Compilation 
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at 
124 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
31. James Madison, Veto Message (Feb. 21, 1811), in 1 A Compilation of 
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at 489–
90 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
32. James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in 1 A Compilation of 
the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at 584–
85 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
33. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A Compilation 
of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897, at 
576, 582 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896). 
34. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 774 
(1824). 
35. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 255. 
36. Id. 
37. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
38. 3 Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, 
Illinois, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 245, 255 
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
39. 4 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in The Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra note 38 at 262, 268. 
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Critics of executive review say that the president has a duty of 
faithful execution of law, 40  but that argument begs the question, 
“Execution of what law?” The Supremacy Clause declares that the 
Constitution is the supreme law. And Marbury declares, as Hamilton 
had argued in The Federalist, 41  that conflicting laws are void. If 
legislation conflicts with the supreme law, which must the executive 
faithfully execute—the legislation or the supreme law? The question 
answers itself. 
What about the argument that a state attorney general owes a 
duty, as a lawyer, to his client—the State or the people—to make an 
argument in defense of state law? Conservative commentator Ed 
Whelan’s central criticism of the state attorneys general who have 
refused to defend the marriage laws of their states is that those 
attorneys general have abandoned their client. But the problem with 
that argument is that the state attorney general is the client.42 The 
state attorney general is an executive officer who ordinarily serves 
either by appointment of the governor or more often by election as an 
independent officer. Like any executive officer, the state attorney 
general takes an oath to support the Constitution in the performance 
of his duties. The state attorney general, as the chief legal officer of 
the state government, has duties that are not equivalent to those of a 
private lawyer representing a client. The state attorney general 
frequently also serves as the chief prosecutor, a minister of justice who 
must seek the truth in the performance of his duties. The state 
attorney general is no ordinary lawyer. His first duty is to the 
Constitution.43 
 
40. See, e.g., Curt A. Levey & Kenneth A. Klukowski, Take Care Now: 
Stare Decisis and the President’s Duty to Defend Acts of Congress, 37 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 377 (2013). 
41. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  
42. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct: Preamble and Scope § 18 
(2013). (“Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, 
statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers 
may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes 
in the client in private client-lawyer relationships.”). 
43. I acknowledge that, in some but not all states, an attorney general may 
not mount, as a plaintiff, an affirmative challenge to the constitu-
tionality of a state law because the attorney general is the defender of 
those laws. See Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the 
States, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 213, 257–58 (2014). But I am unaware of 
any state judicial decision that would deny the authority of a state 
attorney general to admit that a state law violates the Constitution 
when representing a state defendant. 
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II. Examples from My Service in an Office 
of State Attorney General 
Allow me to offer four examples from my tenure in an office of 
state attorney general as each example presents nuances about the 
duty to defend and executive review. The first involves a state ban of 
the commercial distribution of sex toys, a silly law that I defended in 
litigation—despite criticism—because I concluded that it did not 
violate the Constitution. The second involves the installation of a 
monument of the Ten Commandments in a state judicial building, 
which I did not think necessarily violated the Constitution, but litiga-
tion about that monument led me to prosecute a state chief justice on 
charges of judicial misconduct after he refused to abide by a federal 
injunction to remove the monument. The third involves a state law 
restricting school prayer that I refused to defend after I concluded 
that the law violated the free-speech and free-exercise rights of 
students. And the fourth involves two voting rights cases I handled 
under the direction of then Attorney General and now U.S. Senator 
Jeff Sessions. In those cases, we confessed error in federal court 
because other state executive and judicial officials had violated the 
civil rights of Alabama voters. 
Let us consider the silly law first. In 1998, a year after I took the 
oath to serve as attorney general, the Alabama Legislature amended 
the criminal code to make it “unlawful for any person to knowingly 
distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to 
distribute . . . any device designed or marketed as useful primarily 
for the stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary 
value.”44 A first offense was a misdemeanor, and a second offense was 
a felony.45 The law did not prohibit the use or possession of sex toys, 
but only the commercial distribution of them.46 Not surprisingly, some 
sellers of sex toys and their customers filed a federal lawsuit to 
challenge that state law. We now cite that lawsuit, to the amusement 
of my friends and law clerks, as Williams v. Pryor. 
I defended that silly law in two appeals to the court on which I 
now serve, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit. Each time, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with my argument 
that the law was constitutional. The first ruling involved a facial 
challenge to the law,47 and the second ruling involved an as-applied 
 
44. Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ala. 
Code § 13A–12–200.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1998)). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
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challenge. 48  On both occasions, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the 
district court, which had ruled that the law violated the Constitution. 
In the first appeal, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the law satisfied 
the rational-basis test based on “the State’s legitimate government 
interest in public morality.”49 In the second appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit refused to “redefine the constitutional right to privacy to 
cover the commercial distribution of sex toys.”50 
Defending that law was not always pleasant. Some voters fail to 
appreciate the distinction between a silly law and an unconstitutional 
law, and the Alabama press had a field day mocking the law and my 
defense of it. But the Eleventh Circuit understood what was at stake 
when it wrote, “If the people of Alabama in time decide that a 
prohibition on sex toys is misguided, or ineffective, or just plain silly, 
they can repeal the law and be finished with the matter.”51 At one 
point, one of the legislative sponsors of the law visited me and urged 
me to stop defending the law. I responded that my duty required me 
to defend the law so long as I thought the law was constitutional. I 
had a duty to defend the law even though I had no interest in 
devoting substantial resources of my office to enforcing it. I suggested 
to the legislator that he sponsor a bill to repeal the law. I assured him 
that I would not criticize that effort, but he declined to do so. I 
suppose he did not want to draw any new attention to his role in 
sponsoring the law in the first place. But again, my duty as a state 
executive was clear: I had a duty to defend the silly law because it did 
not violate the Constitution. 
Let us consider next the controversy that received the most public 
scrutiny during my tenure as a state attorney general. That 
controversy involved not a state law but a decoration in a state 
judicial building. After his election in 2000 as the Chief Justice of 
Alabama, Roy Moore designed and installed a monument of the Ten 
Commandments to “depict the moral foundation of law.” 52  Chief 
Justice Moore invited a Christian media organization to film the 
installation,53 and soon afterward several citizens filed two federal 
lawsuits that sought an injunction to remove the monument.54 I had 
differences of opinion with Chief Justice Moore about several matters, 
but I did not think that a display of the Ten Commandments in a  
48. Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004). 
49. 240 F.3d at 956. 
50. 378 F.3d at 1250. 
51. Id. 
52. Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 891 So. 2d 848, 850 (Ala. 2004). 
53. Id. at 850–51 n.2. 
54. Id. at 852. 
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courthouse violated the Constitution. After all, depictions of the 
Decalogue appear in other American courtrooms, including in the 
courtroom of the Supreme Court of the United States. But Chief 
Justice Moore did not make his defense of his monument easy as he 
questioned longstanding precedents about the First Amendment. 
Eventually both the district court55 and the Eleventh Circuit56 ruled 
that Moore’s monument violated the Constitution. Then things got 
interesting. 
Chief Justice Moore refused to obey an injunction to remove the 
monument.57 Moore argued that he could ignore the rulings of the fed-
eral courts as contrary to the Constitution.58 He argued that the fed-
eral courts, not he, had violated the Constitution.59 His approach of 
state review of a federal judgment would turn the Supremacy Clause 
upside down. 
I disagreed with Chief Justice Moore’s approach. I instead assisted 
the associate justices of the state supreme court in removing the 
monument and complying with the federal injunction.60 Although I 
did not think that a depiction of the Ten Commandments in a 
courthouse necessarily violated the Constitution, I recognized that 
Article III of the Constitution vested the federal courts with the 
judicial power to decide cases or controversies arising under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. I recognized that Chief 
Justice Moore’s refusal to comply with an injunction entered after he 
had been given an opportunity to defend his position in a trial and an 
appeal was lawless. And I later prosecuted him on charges of judicial 
misconduct and succeeded in having him removed from office.61 
Now let us consider a case where I refused to defend a state law 
because I concluded that the law violated the Constitution. In 1993, 
the Alabama Legislature enacted a law about school prayer.62 The law 
provided that “non-sectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated vol-
untary prayer . . . shall be permitted during compulsory or non-
compulsory” public school events. 63  A parent of a public school 
student and others filed a federal lawsuit that challenged that law as 
 
55. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1293 (M.D. Ala. 2002). 
56. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). 
57. 891 So. 2d at 853. 
58. Id. at 856–57. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 853. 
61. Id. at 853–54.  
62. Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550, 1553 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
63. Id. (quoting Ala. Code § 16–1–20.3(b) (1995)). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
The Separation of Powers and the Federal and State 
Executive Duty to Review the Law 
289 
violating the First Amendment, and in March 1997, two months after 
I had taken the oath to serve as the attorney general, the district 
court ruled in the parent’s favor.64 I quickly studied the ruling because 
I had not previously represented the state, as a deputy attorney 
general, in that litigation, and I announced that I would not appeal 
the ruling. I agreed with the district court that the Alabama law 
infringed the rights of students under the Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. As the district court 
concluded, the Alabama law “define[d] students’ free speech and 
religion rights too narrowly. When these rights attach to students in 
school, they may engage in sectarian, proselytizing religious speech.”65  
I never thought I had a duty to defend that Alabama law because 
I thought it was plainly unconstitutional. I felt no obligation to 
appeal the ruling to the Eleventh Circuit or to petition the Supreme 
Court to allow further judicial review of the law even though neither 
of those courts had ever squarely addressed a law like it. And I felt no 
obligation to defend the constitutional interpretation of the Alabama 
Legislature embodied in that law. The Alabama law favored what it 
called non-sectarian and non-proselytizing prayer even though it is 
unclear whether speech that is both non-sectarian and non-
proselytizing can even be called a prayer. The law purported to 
uphold the free-speech and free-exercise rights of students, but it 
violated those rights instead by favoring certain kinds of speech over 
others. 
Later, the district court and I disagreed about the requirements of 
the First Amendment when the district court enjoined a public school 
system from permitting students to engage in any kind of religious 
speech at a school event.66 In two appeals, the Eleventh Circuit agreed 
with me that the First Amendment protects student-initiated prayer 
and religious speech, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunc-
tion.67 But the governor hired separate counsel and argued that even 
teacher-led prayer was permissible. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that 
argument, of course, but the governor, as a matter of executive 
review, thought that Supreme Court precedents in that area were 
wrong. I stuck to defending the free-speech rights of the students. 
My decisions about the executive duty to defend were influenced 
by the perspective of my predecessor, now U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions, 
for whom I had served as deputy attorney general in charge of any 
civil litigation that he considered to be a priority of his admini- 
64. Id. at 1568. 
65. Id. at 1561. 
66. Chandler v. James, 985 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
67. Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999); Chandler v. 
Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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stration. In that role, I had confessed that state officials had violated 
the federal civil rights of Alabama voters in two cases. And in both 
cases, General Sessions refused to defer to state authorities when 
doing so would have violated federal law. 
In the highest profile representation that General Sessions 
appointed me to undertake,68 I confessed that a state judicial ruling 
violated the constitutional rights of voters.69 A state circuit court had 
ordered state election officials to count previously uncounted absentee 
ballots in the election for Chief Justice of Alabama in 1994.70 In 
keeping with the longstanding interpretation of state officials, the 
local election officials had refused to count any absentee ballot for 
which a voter’s signature had not been witnessed by either two adults 
or a notary public.71 When the state circuit court ordered the count-
ing of the excluded ballots after the election, the challenger in the 
election for Chief Justice filed a federal complaint and obtained an 
injunction to stop the after-the-fact changing of the rules of the 
election to alter the outcome.72 When General Sessions assumed office, 
we changed the litigation position of the State and refused to defend 
the ruling of the state circuit court. We agreed with the challenger in 
the federal lawsuit that changing the rules of the election would 
violate the constitutional rights of Alabama voters. We maintained 
that position about the requirements of federal law, even after the 
Eleventh Circuit certified the question of state law to the Supreme 
Court of Alabama, which sustained the ruling of the state circuit 
court.73 General Sessions and I, as his deputy, never deferred to the 
decisions of the state courts or defended them as not violating federal 
law. 
In the second case, I confessed error that a state-sponsored settle-
ment of a voting-rights lawsuit violated federal law.74 When voters 
filed a lawsuit that challenged the at-large election of appellate 
judges, the previous attorney general crafted a settlement.75 That 
settlement, which had been approved by a federal district court, 
required the creation of new judgeships on those courts to be filled by 
gubernatorial appointment—not election—and created a nominating  
68. Roe v. Alabama, 68 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995). 
69. Roe v. Mobile Cnty. Appointing Bd., 904 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 n.5 (S.D. 
Ala. 1995). 
70. 68 F.3d at 405. 
71. Id. at 406–07. 
72. Id. at 405. 
73. Id. at 406. 
74. White v. Alabama, 74 F.3d 1058, 1068 n.35 (11th Cir. 1996). 
75. Id. at 1062. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
The Separation of Powers and the Federal and State 
Executive Duty to Review the Law 
291 
commission for those appointments. And that nominating commission 
had a racial quota. But on behalf of General Sessions, I confessed 
error. Voters intervened in the lawsuit and challenged the settlement. 
Those intervening voters and I agreed that the settlement violated the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Eleventh Circuit ruled, as we had 
argued, that Alabama could not remedy a denial of voting rights with 
an appointment process.76 The whole point of the Voting Rights Act 
is to allow voters an opportunity to elect the candidates of their 
choice. 
In none of these instances where I, or my predecessor, refused to 
defend a state law, state judicial ruling, or state-sponsored settlement 
did any conservatives criticize our exercise of the power of executive 
review. Perhaps that absence of criticism can be attributed to the fact 
that political conservatives liked the end result of our decisions. The 
governor of my state favored teacher-led prayer, but he agreed with 
me that a state law favoring non-sectarian and non-proselytizing 
prayers was not worth defending. The state judicial ruling about 
absentee ballots that we refused to defend favored the incumbent 
chief justice, a Democrat supported by the trial lawyers’ association, 
and our position in the federal lawsuit favored the Republican 
challenger supported by the business community. And the state-
sponsored settlement of the voting rights case we refused to defend 
had been crafted by a Democratic attorney general and favored the 
interests of his political party. 
Perhaps the politics of the moment can help a state executive 
better interpret the Constitution. It can fairly be said, after all, that 
Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln favored the interests of 
their political allies when they engaged in executive review. It can be 
said too that President Obama and the state executives, all 
Democrats, who have favored a constitutional right for homosexual 
couples to marry have sided with their political allies, but we will 
have to wait to see whether their argument ever achieves the 
widespread acceptance that Jefferson’s and Lincoln’s perspectives now 
enjoy. 
What matters is not whether an executive defends a law with 
which he or his political party disagrees but whether his 
interpretation adheres to the text and structure of the Constitution. 
Jefferson and Lincoln passed that test. And, when contested, my legal 
positions in the earlier-described controversies, where I sided with my 
political allies, prevailed in the end—in the objective view of the 
federal courts. 
In my experiences as a state executive, I understood my duty to 
be true to the Constitution and federal law as supreme. I understood 
 
76. Id. at 1071. 
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that my oath required me to defend laws that do not violate the 
Constitution and to refrain from violating the civil rights of 
Americans. I understood that duty required me to interpret the 
Constitution and not surrender my responsibility of interpretation to 
another branch of government. I understood that I would violate my 
oath if I were to enforce and defend an unconstitutional law that had 
caused a real injury to some person and that I would shirk my 
responsibility if I were to leave it to the judiciary to correct the 
problem without my aid. And I understood that, when the judiciary 
decided a case within its jurisdiction, the Constitution obliged me to 
respect the final judgment of the judiciary in that case. 
The rule of law demands that conservatives who favor the 
exercise of executive review not criticize liberals for exercising that 
power but consider instead the merits of their interpretations. 
Conservatives can make their case against a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage, but conservatives should respect the authority for 
executive review, as practiced by Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln. 
III. The Comparative Advantages of Executive Review 
There are at least three comparative advantages to this classical 
understanding of executive review. First, for those concerned about 
respecting the judicial role, the classical understanding of an 
executive’s duty better protects the integrity of the judicial process. 
Second, a classical understanding of executive review forces public 
officials to take the Constitution seriously. Third, when we accept the 
rightfulness of executive review, we can move beyond a trivial debate 
about doing a job without thought of its consequences to the impor-
tant discussion about what the Constitution means. 
As to the first advantage, those concerned about the judicial role 
should want the judiciary to entertain controversies where the 
executive enforces and defends the law because the executive 
genuinely believes that the law satisfies the Constitution. An execu-
tive committed to enforcing the law is more likely to make the best 
argument for its defense. The Supreme Court explained long ago that, 
because a “collusive” suit “is not in any real sense adversary,” it fails 
to “safeguard . . . the integrity of the judicial process, . . . which 
[is] . . . indispensable to adjudication of constitutional 
questions . . . .”77 But when the executive enforces a law that it 
refuses to defend or defends a law that it believes should not be 
enforced, the executive invites charges of collusion. 
The Supreme Court debated what to do about this problem in 
Windsor, where the Obama administration continued to enforce the 
 
77. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943).  
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Defense of Marriage Act while it refused to defend the constitu-
tionality of the Act. The majority described that posture as having 
“created a procedural dilemma.”78 The majority fretted that it had to 
protect what it called “the Supreme Court’s primary role in deter-
mining the constitutionality of a law that has inflicted real injury on a 
plaintiff” and avoid having that role become “only secondary to the 
President’s.”79 The majority declared that “it poses grave challenges 
to the separation of powers for the Executive at a particular moment 
to be able to nullify Congress’s enactment solely on its own initiative 
and without any determination from the Court.”80 But Justice Scalia 
responded in a dissenting opinion joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justice Thomas, “[w]here the Executive is enforcing an unconstitu-
tional law, suit will of course lie; but if, in that suit, the Executive 
admits the unconstitutionality of the law, the litigation should end in 
an order or a consent decree enjoining enforcement.”81 
I agree with Justice Scalia’s related suggestion that the better 
course for the executive is “neither to enforce nor to defend the 
statute he believe[s] to be unconstitutional.”82 The executive sends a 
terrible message when he enforces a law that he believes violates the 
Constitution. That is, the executive tells the person he injures that 
enforcing a defective law matters more than respecting the Constitu-
tion. When he later admits the unconstitutionality of the law in court, 
the executive tells the injured person that having the judiciary take 
years to make a final judgment about whether the law violates the 
Constitution matters more than the injury the executive admits caus-
ing in the interim. But if the executive refuses to enforce the law he 
believes violates the Constitution, he ordinarily injures no person and 
leaves for another day the duty of defending that law for an executive 
committed to its enforcement. If that day comes, because the voters 
decide to elect an executive who believes the law is constitutional and 
should be enforced, then the judiciary will likely have the opportunity 
to adjudicate the question without any procedural dilemma. The ju-
diciary has no right to complain about being relegated to a secondary 
role so long as it remains empowered to decide cases or controversies 
where the parties are truly adverse. 
I acknowledge that, when a state attorney general refuses to 
defend an unconstitutional law, the controversy may remain justic-
iable because he may play no role in its enforcement. States ordinarily 
 
78. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013). 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 2702. 
82. Id. 
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lack the unitary executive of the federal government. That is why the 
Attorney General of Ohio last term filed a brief in defense of an 
elections commission and a separate brief as amicus curiae about the 
constitutionality of a state law in a case before the Supreme Court.83 
In a case that involved the Federal Elections Commission, Solicitor 
General Robert Bork and Assistant Solicitor Frank Easterbrook too 
filed a separate amicus brief in a landmark case about the constitu-
tionality of a federal campaign finance law.84 But the multiple legal 
positions that accompany a government with several executive officers 
means that no harm comes from a state attorney general providing an 
independent perspective that a law violates the Constitution. The 
judiciary can still hear an opposing argument from an officer charged 
with enforcing the law and perhaps another official such as the 
governor. 
As to the second advantage of the classical understanding, 
executive review requires elected officials to take the Constitution 
seriously. Executive review demands that elected officials not be lazy 
in the performance of their duties, and it allows the people to hold 
executives accountable for their interpretations. We should not allow 
executives to escape responsibility for violating the Constitution by 
shifting the blame to the judiciary as the only branch with the 
authority to interpret our fundamental law. We should not condone, 
for example, a president or governor signing legislation while denounc-
ing it as unconstitutional and leaving the judiciary responsible for 
repairing any damage from that violation. For example, when he 
signed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, President 
George W. Bush stated that the legislation had “flaws” and presented 
“serious constitutional concerns.”85 I agree with Professor Saikrishna 
Prakash that this practice of sign and denounce “should be consigned 
to the ash heap of history, like communism and bell bottom pants.”86 
After all, this practice only encourages legislators to enact more 
unconstitutional legislation. 
Executives—and legislators, for that matter—swear to support 
the Constitution, but they take no oath to judicial precedents. And 
 
83. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio Attorney General Michael Dewine in 
Support of Neither Party, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. 
Ct. 2334 (2014) (No. 13-193). 
84. Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos. 75-436 & 75-
437). 
85. Press Release, George W. Bush, President of the United States, The 
White House, President Signs Campaign Finance Reform Act (Mar. 27, 
2002). 
86. Prakash, supra note 2, at 82. 
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we should not want them to do so. Executives should consider judicial 
precedents for their persuasive weight, but the judiciary has not 
always been correct in its interpretation of the Constitution. At times 
the Supreme Court has been outrageously wrong. The federal courts 
were wrong, and President Jefferson was right about the Sedition Act. 
The Supreme Court was wrong, and President Lincoln was right 
about Dred Scott. And that infamous mistake by the Supreme Court, 
of course, helped cause the Civil War. Sometimes executives have pre-
vailed in the course of history in interpreting the most contested and 
important provisions of the Constitution, and we should be thankful 
for it.  
And the judiciary cannot deny its own fallibility. After all, the 
Supreme Court was wrong in Plessy v. Ferguson,87 as the Supreme 
Court later admitted in Brown v. Board of Education.88 An executive 
necessarily errs when he defers to the precedents of the Supreme 
Court, instead of the Constitution itself, as the supreme law of the 
land. As Attorney General Edwin Meese explained in a famous speech 
more than a quarter-century ago, if the decisions of the Supreme 
Court were on par with the Constitution itself, then the Court could 
not overrule or even reconsider its erroneous decisions.89 And the 
whole reason the judiciary has jury trials, appellate review, and 
petitions for writs of certiorari is that the judiciary needs those 
processes to help correct its own errors. 
Executive review respects the fact that Americans can disagree in 
good faith about the meaning of the Constitution. After all, even 
when it adheres to precedent in its controversial decisions, the 
Supreme Court is often divided five to four with excellent legal minds 
in sharp disagreement about what the Constitution requires. If just-
ices of the Supreme Court disagree among themselves about the 
meaning of the Constitution in the exercise of their judicial power, 
then other constitutional officers too have a right in the exercise of 
their powers to disagree with the Supreme Court about the meaning 
of the Constitution. To be sure, the Constitution is law, and courts 
have expertise in construing laws, but executives ordinarily either are 
lawyers too—as in the case of state attorneys general—or, in the case 
of governors and the President, have expert lawyers to provide them 
counsel. At least with executives, the American people have the right 
to oust them from office when they misconstrue the Constitution. 
Congress, of course, has never impeached a federal judge for miscon-
struing the Constitution.  
87. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
88. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).  
89. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979, 
983 (1987). 
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Finally, when we agree about the legitimacy of executive review, 
we can have a more meaningful debate about what the Constitution 
actually requires. When an executive interprets the Constitution in a 
controversial manner and an opponent charges that the task should 
be left to the judiciary, we hear only one side of the debate about 
what the Constitution requires. To criticize an executive for interpret-
ing the Constitution is not to criticize his interpretation, but his 
interpretation is what matters. Instead of demanding that the execu-
tive defend a law, we should debate whether the law violates the 
Constitution. Instead of hearing one state attorney general criticize 
another for “not doing his job,” we should hear two attorneys general 
explain their conflicting interpretations of the Constitution. If one 
attorney general concludes that homosexual couples have a constitu-
tional right to marry never before recognized in our constitutional 
history, then that attorney general should explain his interpretation. 
If another attorney general disagrees and concludes that the Constitu-
tion leaves the definition of marriage to the States, then that attorney 
general too should explain his interpretation. But that debate will be 
impoverished if it instead involves only the propriety of executive 
review, which is as old as the Republic itself. 
History proves that our country benefits when ordinary 
Americans and their officials engage in serious constitutional debate. 
Our Nation benefited from those kinds of serious debates, for 
example, at our Founding, during and after our Civil War, and during 
the Civil Rights Movement. We should welcome appeals to the 
Constitution by our elected officials. We should welcome appeals to 
the Constitution in debates among lawyers and judges whether assoc-
iated with the Federalist Society or the American Constitution Soci-
ety. We should welcome appeals to the Constitution by our citizenry 
in our political discourse too whether from the Tea Party or the 
American Civil Liberties Union. 
The Constitution is not the exclusive province of the judiciary. 
The Constitution begins with three words—“We the people”—because 
the Constitution belongs to the American people. The American 
people wrote it, ratified it, and many times amended it, and many 
thousands of Americans died fighting for it. The American people own 
it. And the American people have a right to demand that our leaders 
obey it as the supreme law of the land. The right to make that 
demand explains why the Constitution requires all our high officials—
executives, legislators, and judges—to swear an oath to support it. 
We say that we have a government of laws, not of men, but that 
saying presupposes that every branch can and will interpret it and 
follow it in the performance of its powers. We should demand nothing 
less. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
297 
Facilitating Incomplete 
Contracts 
Wendy Netter Epstein† 
Abstract 
Contract law abhors incompleteness. Although no contract can be 
entirely complete, the idea of a purposefully incomplete or underspe-
cified contract is antithetical to lawyers’ ideals of certainty for the 
parties and for the law. Indeed, contract law is designed to incentivize 
parties to specifically articulate their intentions. Yet there is a 
growing body of interdisciplinary work in economics and cognitive 
psychology demonstrating that highly specified contracts tend to stifle 
intrinsic motivation and innovation, whereas less-specified contracts—
particularly in public-private contracting, IP, and contracting for 
innovation—can induce higher effort levels and a more cooperative 
principal–agent relationship than the traditional approach. Neverthe-
less, there remain both entrenched doctrinal and sociolegal deterrents 
to drafting less-specified contracts.  
This Article argues that the existing doctrinal roadblocks to 
incomplete contracts are out of step with the normative goals of 
commercial contracting—promoting efficiency and incentivizing com-
mercial activity. The indefiniteness doctrine and current approaches 
to contract interpretation, for instance, over-deter the use of 
incomplete contracting even when it would be efficient. Ultimately, 
this Article suggests a new doctrinal approach for those contracts 
where the law should incentivize incomplete contracting, borrowing 
from principles of constitutional interpretation: dynamic contextualist 
interpretation. Courts should look not only to party intent at the 
moment when the contract was formed but should consider how 
intentions developed during contract performance. Rather than pun-
ishing incompleteness, flexibility should guide determinations of 
validity and questions of interpretation. 
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